• Troops avenge soldier's death
• Parliament backs off referendum
• Seven injured in violence

• Generals to be tried for atrocities
• Probe may spark military backlash
• Protesters attack rubber plantation
• Reformasi in Bandung
• Rise of Islam- based 'vigilantes'

• Warning on Jakarta arms trade
• TNI's territorial structures natural to many
• The passage of secrets

• Government debt 71.9 billion
• GDP growth seen at 1.8 percent
• Econonomy shows signs of life

East Timor

New evidence of militia-TNI links

Indonesian Observer - December 17, 1999

Jakarta -- The commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) yesterday in Jakarta revealed it's new investigation results from East Timor, concerning the violence which was conducted before and after the UN sponsored plebiscite. The results show evidence that the militia were paid by local administrators and the military.

Speaking to a press conference here, the chairman of Kontras' working body, Munir, summarised the findings of investigations in East Timor between late September and late October 1999. Munir said that the full reports will be given to KPP HAM as inputs to the effort of upholding the law.

These findings are evidence which proves the militia and military role in several incidents of violence before and after the UN sponsored plebiscite in East Timor. There is also evidence of the links.

"We found letters which described the activities of the militia and military, left abandoned in many `concentration camps' and at their training sites. What surprised us most was finding a bundle of books which contained the militia salary records. The printed documents were filed neatly by a computer," he explained, and said that the records show that each militia member was paid as much as Rp. 150,000 per month.

According to Munir, it was very strange when someone [in this case the militiamen] was paid for fighting for his political beliefs. He disclosed that from the testimony of witnesses, the militia salaries were paid from local bureaucrats and administrators, either civil or military.

He continued that Kontras also found some mass graveyards in different areas.

"These showed up from the landscape's physical form, scatterings of flowers which littered the sites and information from local residents." In respect of this evidence Munir said it needed more investigation because so far Kontras had not dug up graves to count the corpses.

Apart from that, Munir said that Kontras has learned that there was a long history of violence in East Timor from January to its peak from September 2nd to 10th.

"This process was closely related to the options which Habibie gave earlier this year," Munir said. He conveyed that this violent period hadn't been evaluated properly by the military and "It was not corrected by the military." Moreover, the martial law imposed in East Timor after the ballot was conducted had caused more havoc, arson and riots which displaced East Timor people as refugees to East Nusatenggara.

"The violations which took place in January, establishments of militia until March and the ensuing violence in several areas in East Timor had a systematic relationship and this peaked in the Suai massacre, which has been reported on by KPP HAM," he said.

This open violence has been publicly acknowledged. "Most of the people who lived in east Timor at that time were eyewitnesses. When Kontras questioned them over what happened on, for example, September 9, they can always answer consistently," Munir explained.

According to Munir, Kontras was convinced that the military operational pattern in that area had a strong connection with the violence which intimidated the local people there.

"There were political decisions from Jakarta which had systematic relationships with everything that happened in East Timor in those nine months [January-September 1999]." Responding to the TNI statement which said that what they did in East Timor in those months was to execute the country's duty, and cursed anybody who questioned this as a nationalist, Munir said this was all wrong.

"We didn't see the relationship between duty to the country and nationalism. Is that true if executing the country's duty is by violence?" he asked enigmatically.

Munir also stressed that if they keep defending their argument that they were just doing their job in executing the country's duty, they had to explain which orders they did execute, the violence within their responsibilities and their failure to prevent it.

Factions are key to nationhood

International Herald Tribune - December 16, 1999

Michael Richardson, Dili -- Now that the East Timorese independence coalition no longer has a common enemy to hold it together, there are signs that it is starting to fracture. Its political leaders meanwhile acknowledge that they must either stay united in trying to rebuild the shattered territory or start campaigning for political power in the independent democratic state they hope to achieve after 24 years of repression by Indonesia.

"The real enemy now is within," said Vicente Soares Paria, a lecturer in social and political science at the University of East Timor. "We have many competing factions and interests, and we must reconcile them. That is the political challenge we face." The coalition, known as the National Council of Timorese Resistance, was formed by 18 political, student, and civic groups to present common front to the outside world.

The issue of political cohesion is of concern to the United Nations, which is in charge of East Timor's transition to independence and wants to create the foundation for a self- sustaining economy and stable government in one of the poorest places in Asia before the handover takes place.

The issue of when and how party politics resume in East Timor is also of concern to the foreign governments, international financial institutions and nongovernment aid organizations that are involved in the effort to help the territory recover from the violence and destruction by militias and their Indonesian military backers that followed the overwhelming vote August 30 to separate from Indonesia.

Governments and agencies involved in the rebuilding of East Timor will meet Friday in Tokyo to discuss an ambitious reconstruction program that would start in the next six to nine months. The meeting is to be overseen by the United Nations and the World Bank.

Given the shortage of skills and resources in East Timor, many UN and foreign aid officials say they believe that the coalition leaders should put nation-building ahead of politics until the territory can run its own affairs in a competent and peaceful manner.

"We need to persuade them to stay united to avoid premature political competition," Sergio Vieira de Mello, who heads the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, said in a recent interview.

The United Nations is widely expected to prepare the territory for independence within three years. But Mr. de Mello said he had deliberately not started talking about a timetable since his administration started work last month, partly because "I do not want to trigger early jockeying for political power." Mr. de Mello has formed a special consultative panel to give advice on all major policy decisions the UN makes in East Timor. The panel, which held its first meeting last weekend, has a majority of East Timorese members, including seven representatives of the independence movement, three from groups that wanted autonomy within Indonesia, and a priest from the Roman Catholic Church, the main denomination in East Timor.

A recent survey coordinated by the World Bank concluded that $260 million to $300 million was needed over the next three years for longer-term development and reconstruction in East Timor, primarily in infrastructure, health and education.

Xanana Gusmao, who heads the council and whom many East Timorese want to be their first president, said he hoped that the territory could become independent in no more than two years. But Mr. Gusmao conceded that lack of money, skills and equipment was a major problem for the East Timorese in preparing for independence.

"The main problem is our own capacity to respond to the challenge and the demands of our people," he said in an interview. "But I believe that after we reorganize ourselves, we can be a real partner in all these international projects." Mr. Gusmao and other council leaders are also preoccupied with trying to improve relations with Indonesia so that trade, banking, and air and sea transport links can be resumed as soon as possible, that East Timor is not destabilized by continuing hostile militia activity from West Timor and that more than 100,000 East Timorese can return home from camps in West Timor.

It is not clear how much longer the ideological, class and economic interests represented in the pro-independence council and the United Nations' new consultative panel can continue working together for the common good.

"The council is a very loose coalition of 18 organizations with people from all sorts of viewpoints," said Jose Ramos-Horta, one of its senior officials. "The council is a transitional body, and that's healthy. If it stays too long, we risk becoming a one-party state." Mr. Ramos-Horta said that if reconciliation and reconstruction in East Timor went well, the territory could become independent in less than two years. But he said independence would have to be preceded by the first democratic village council elections, perhaps in six months, and by voting a year later for a national legislature and a constitutional- drafting convention. "What is important," he said, "is that political differences are settled peacefully."

I don't feel guilty: Guterres

Sydney Morning Herald - December 16, 1999

Lindsay Murdoch -- Eurico Guterres looks a beaten man. Gone are his thug bodyguards and the copy-cat red beret uniform of Indonesia's elite Kopassus forces. Gone also are his bravado and threats to kill.

Instead, the militia leader -- who ordered mass murders and the destruction of East Timor -- is living under an assumed name in a seedy hotel in north Jakarta.

"I don't feel I am guilty of anything," he says. "It's possible to question me but I cannot take responsibility because what happened was the result of political crimes."

Three months after carrying out his threat to turn East Timor into a wasteland if Timorese voted to reject Jakarta's rule, Guterres is beginning to feel abandoned by Indonesia and hints that he might one day name names in Indonesia's armed forces.

"The Indonesian military is also responsible because at that time they were trusted to secure East Timor," he says. "Now I cannot say who is exactly responsible ... but I will say it in the end when all of the politics are under investigation. Now I don't want to say a word." The state-funded Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission has summoned Guterres, 27, to question him about East Timor atrocities.

Under the laws of most countries Guterres, a former street gang leader in the East Timorese capital, Dili, would be facing charges of mass murder.

In one incident alone, which has been researched by international human rights groups, Guterres publicly ordered his men to "capture and kill if necessary" family members of the independence leader, Mr Manuel Carrascalao. Within an hour of the order, 100 of Guterres's militia stormed Mr Carrascalao's house and killed 12 people, including his 16-year-old adopted son.

The Indonesian military recruited and trained Guterres, who commanded a paramilitary group called Aitarak, or Thorn, which was given the responsibility for security in Dili and often joined other militia groups in attacks on independence supporters outside the city.

Guterres says he has 53,000 supporters living in refugee camps in Indonesian-ruled West Timor who cannot return to East Timor because they would be attacked.

"I will stay in Indonesia because I'm Indonesian," he says. "But if Indonesia does not want the pro-integration side to remain in Indonesia, maybe we will ask for political asylum in another country because it's impossible for us to go back to East Timor, even though it is our homeland." Guterres confirmed an announcement on Monday by another militia leader, Joao da Silva Tavares, that militia forces in West Timor would be disbanded.

Asked about repeated threats he had made to attack an Australian-led international force in East Timor, Guterres says: "We have no intention to do that."

A licence to print money

The Australian - December 14, 1999

David Nason -- The Australian consortium behind the failed Dili Lodge hotel venture in East Timor hoped to reap an annual profit of nearly $7 million, while initially operating tax-free and paying wages of less than 60c an hour for local staff.

A business plan obtained by The Australian shows that Wayne Thomas, the millionaire Darwin car salesman, forecast a 250% annual return on investment to the 18 investors who paid him $70,000 each for a 2.5% share of the action.

But the venture collapsed last week when the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor ordered Mr Thomas, a 50% stakeholder, to close the hotel by this Thursday. UNTAET maintains his lease with Manuel Carrascalao, the influential Timorese businessman, is illegal.

Mr Thomas, who has denied allegations of prostitution and money laundering at the 200-room hotel, was in Dili yesterday attempting to persuade UNTAET to rescind its order. He insists his five-year lease with a five-year option is legal, and that UNTAET's actions have denied him due process and natural justice.

Despite that, the business plan drawn up by Mr Thomas raises serious moral questions about profits on offer to Australian business in the reconstruction of East Timor.

The plan emphasises cheap labour and the expectation profits will be free of tax "in the first year or so". It suggests ground-floor investors would be "well looked after" by Timorese political figures in the future, and that the Australian army "would no doubt provide a high degree of security to the venture". The plan further suggests that the views expressed by Shane Stone, the Liberal Party president and Northern Territory MP, played a key part in getting the venture under way and selling it to investors.

It states: "He [Mr Stone] basically said, 'A few people want to do this and other business projects but no one can find the land. If Manuel [Carrascalao] can give you land, you have 12 months' start'." But Mr Stone yesterday denied he had pushed the project, saying he was angry his name had been used by Mr Thomas. He also denied any knowledge the hotel would operate in a tax- free environment.

"All I did was make a passive investment [of $70,000] through an investment company of which I am a director and shareholder," Mr Stone said.

"I did not see the business plan, I did not push the project along and I am not involved in the operations." According to the business plan, capital costs of $2.7 million would be fully recovered within six months, while the projected net profit of $130,000 a week did not include "substantial" further profits from bar sales and meals at the hotel.

Wages for Timorese housemaids, gardeners and kitchen hands would be $40 a week. This works out at less than 60 cents an hour for the estimated six-day, 72-hour week.

Mr Thomas was to draw a $100,000 annual management fee, but only if investors received a minimum 20% return on their investment.

Mr Thomas could not be reached for comment yesterday but documents provided by his office said the hotel was employing 109 staff, of whom 98 were Timorese. The Timorese were being provided with free meals and their wages were above the standard rate for Dili.

Militia organisation disbanded

Agence France-Presse - December 14, 1999 (abridged)

Jakarta -- East Timorese militia supremo Joao da Silva Tavares has officially disbanded an umbrella organization for pro- Indonesian militias ordering them to hand over all arms, a report said here Tuesday.

The disbanding of the East Timorese Fighter Force (PPTT) came at a ceremony attended by Tavares and various militia leaders in a field in Atambua in West Timor on Monday, the Kompas daily said.

"Considering the MPR decree ... on the popular consultation in East Timor and the results of the PPTT meeting in Atambua in November on the prospect of the existence of the PPTT, we herewith state the disbanding of the PPTT," militia supreme commander Tavares said.

All militia members should now hand over their firearms, including home-made ones, to security authorities and get rid of all uniforms and hats, Tavares said. "All members of the PPTT should now become ordinary members of society," Tavares said in a written statement.

"With this disbanding, militia members can now return to East Timor and it is hoped that the pro-independence supporters will be able to accept them and together with them build a new East Timor that is peaceful, just, prosperous and democratic," said militia leader Pedro Pereira from Bobonaro district.

Tavaeres said in his statement that armed struggle was no longer suitable to the political views of the East Timorese loyal to the Republic of Indonesia, and political struggle was more realistic.

The official disbanding of the PPTT was also aimed at ending the impression that Indonesian West Timor was being used as a basis for the PPTT's armed struggle, Kompas said.

Tavares met Sunday with the leader of the pro-independence Falintil guerrilla forces, Xanana Gusmao, in the West Timor border town of Motaain.

Gusmao called on all East Timorese still in West Timor and in other Indonesian regions to return home and help build a free state of East Timor.

Gusmao said last week about 110,000 of his people are still in West Timor wanting to return, and both sides said after the meeting they were trying to make it easier for East Timorese refugees to come home. Tavares has reportedly called for guarantees that militia members would not become the targets of revenge attacks.

"We also have the right to stay in our own homeland, East Timor, but if they do that [revenge] we will not return home," Tavares has said.

Intel ordered nuns massacre

Agence France-Presse - December 14, 1999

Dili -- A commander of one of East Timor's anti-independence militias has admitted he was behind one of the territory's most horrific massacres and claims he was acting on the orders of Indonesian special forces.

Joni Marques, commander of the Team Alpha militia in Los Palos town, told an Indonesian inquiry team he had been responsible for a September 25 ambush in which eight people -- two nuns, four male clergy, an Indonesian journalist and a teenage girl -- were killed.

The attack took place near Los Palos in a remote part of eastern East Timor shortly after international peacekeepers arrived in the capital, Dili.

"He clearly stated that he's the one that killed eight people in Los Palos and that he was trained by a Kopassus [special forces] unit and that he was ordered also to carry out killings by a number of Kopassus officers," Helmi Fauzi, a member of the inquiry team, told journalists here.

Fauzi is a member of the Indonesian Commission for the Investigation of Human Rights Abuses in East Timor. Marques was interviewed at Dili jail, where he is awaiting trial. The inquiry commissioners have spoken to some 30 witnesses over the last seven days in their second visit to East Timor.

After an earlier visit they concluded that the violence that erupted after East Timor's August 30 vote for independence had involved collusion between the militias, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) and national police (Polri).

They said they obtained testimony and documents that showed high-ranking members of the Indonesian armed forces and national police were behind the militia.

The commission has now released more detailed allegations about Indonesian support for the militias.

"SGI, a notorious combat intelligence unit dominated by Kopassus members, was heavily involved to set up, arm and co- ordinate the militias in each of the regencies," said Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, another commission member.

But she said SGI was not acting alone. High-ranking military and police officers "actually commanded this operation," she said.

Nursyahbani said the military and police collected, dumped and buried bodies from massacres. They also cleaned the crime scenes to hide evidence, she said.

Military officers were seconded to militia units to co- ordinate operations, which also had close links to civilian authorites such as district heads, she said. Many district heads were in fact leaders of the militias, Nursyahbani said.

The commission focussed on three massacres. Leonard Simanjuntak, an assistant to the commission, said 50 to 100 people died in an attack on September 5-6 at the church in Suai town. Another 50 were murdered on April 5-6 at another church, in the town of Liquica, he said. An attack on September 8 at the police station in Maliana left 30-40 people, Simanjuntak said.

Nursyahbani said the commission obtained documents that show TNI and Polri "planned and implemented the burning of East Timor, as well as forcefully displaced the population to West Timor." She said lists have been found of pro-independence people targetted for death in what she termed "indications of genocide policy." The Indonesian commission was set up following Jakarta's refusal to respect the results of a UN commission of inquiry into the post-ballot violence in East Timor.

The UN commission, which spent nine days in East Timor, is due to report back to Secretary General Kofi Annan by the end of this month. On the basis of their report, Annan will then have to decide whether to recommend the creation of an international war crimes tribunal for East Timor.

UN overwhelmed by murder cases

Agence France-Presse - December 13, 1999

Dili -- UN police in East Timor have been overwhelmed by the number of murder cases they must investigate with limited resources after the wave of violence that swept this territory after its August 30 vote for independence.

"We currently have probably about 120 files," said Superintendent Martin Davies, the London detective who heads a team of about 15 investigators at the Dili headquarters of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET.) "It is totally overwhelming. We are having to prioritize everything." A UN civilian police took over responsibility for all investigations from Interfet, the international peacekeeping force, a week ago.

Military police had been investigating crimes since the peacekeepers arrived on September 20 to stop a campaign of murder, rape, arson and forced deportation conducted by militias and their backers in the Indonesian armed forces.

"They are leaving a small team of investigators behind to ensure the transition goes smoothly," Davies said.

He said his office was trying to give priority to cases where forensic evidence was in danger of being lost as the rainy season arrived.

But some evidence was inevitably disappearing, he said. "It is obvious that things we would like to be able to secure, we just cannot do it at the moment," said Davies, a five-year homicide investigator with the Metropolitan Police in London, England.

Interfet soldiers have been helping to collect evidence but Davies said he was waiting for other foreign experts to arrive. "We have been promised people from Australia, from England and from Norway. Hopefully these people will come sooner, rather than later," he said.

The head of UNTAET, Sergio Vieira de Mello, made a similar appeal on November 24, when he said evidence was being lost and urged the swift arrival of foreign forensic help.

Davies said a second priority area for his investigators were cases where suspects were already in custody and trials could be expected in the new year. About 25 murder suspects are currently held by Interfet in connection with the recent violence, Davies said.

Although police were working on close to 120 files, the number of murders was higher than that because the cases include massacres at churches in the towns of Suai and Liquica, and a massacre at the police station in Maliana, he said.

"We have not really been able, since we have taken over, to work out the full extent of the atrocities that have taken place," he said. Until refugees return to East Timor it will be unclear whether they were dead or have been staying elsewhere, he said.

In addition to the murders, the headquarters team is looking into about four rape cases. One victim was raped and murdered, Davies said.

"We have received information all the time that a lot of rape atrocities took place," he said. The victims, however, have been reticent to talk about their horror. "Out here, obviously, we're starting from scratch. We've got to put something in place to encourage people to come forward," he said.

Most murder cases linked to the militia violence were handled by the headquarters team. Davies said another 30-35 investigators work in the districts outside Dili. The total number of investigators should double in the next few months, he said.

The militias, backed by elements in the Indonesian military, went on a rampage after it was announced that East Timor's population had voted overwhelmingly for independence.

Refugees still face harassment

Sydney Morning Herald - December 13, 1999

Hamish Mcdonald, Dili -- The Australian commander of the United Nations peacekeeping force in East Timor has appealed for the international community to continue to pressure Indonesia to allow the remaining 100,000 displaced people in West Timor to return home.

At the same time, Interfet Commander Major-General Peter Cosgrove revealed he has written to his Indonesian counterpart across the border, detailing specific instances of pro-Indonesian militias harassing refugees preparing to return.

In the same letter, General Cosgrove also complained about the behaviour of the Indonesian Army's district commander in charge of the border region around the enclave of Oecussi.

The latest incident of militia harassment came at the refugee camp in Labur, 50 kilometres south of Atambua in West Timor, on Thursday as the camp's East Timorese were preparing to board a convoy of trucks sent to take them home.

"Militia turned up, and the TNI [Indonesian military] did nothing to prevent the militia from intimidating people. One family made it out," General Cosgrove said yesterday.

The setback came only two days after the Interfet leader held a meeting at the border village of Batugade with the new commander of Indonesia's Udayana military district covering West Timor, Major-General Kiki Syahnakri. East Timorese resistance leader Mr Xanana Gusmao also attended the meeting, which aimed to lay out a path for the return of displaced people and reconciling pro-Indonesian groups.

Speaking of last Thursday's incident, General Cosgrove said: "It's a great frustration, and I think the international community needs to ... keep a focus on the fact that there's 100,000 East Timorese still dispossessed, displaced ...".

General Cosgrove has written to General Syahnakri detailing two instances where the district commander of Kefamenanu, Lieutenant-Colonel Manurung, had shown partisanship with militias and harassed people returning to the Oecussi enclave.

During one incident 10 days ago, Australian troops at the Oecussi border detained a suspected militia leader attempting to return with a group of refugees.

Five minutes later, a militia leader named Amoco Soares arrived at the border post and incited Indonesian Army troops to threaten the Australian troops unless the man was returned. An Australian corporal calmed the tension and the two bodies of troops moved back from their close contact positions.

However, on another recent occasion the Indonesian local commander, Colonel Manurung, told Australian officers in Oecussi that he would stop the return of all displaced people to the enclave unless a detained militia leader, the brother of Amoco Soares, was released. Only about 13,000 of the enclave's population of 52,000 have so far returned.

Despite the incidents, General Cosgrove expressed confidence that the situation would improve with the appointment of General Syahnakri as regional commander. General Syahnakri had been commander in Dili when Indonesian forces were withdrawing from East Timor.

"I put on the record that I was very appreciative of his determination to navigate through a very difficult period when there was a large number of TNI soldiers here, many of whom were East Timorese, and who plainly had great difficulty accepting the election outcome and their own orders to leave East Timor," he said.

"This was a difficult period for all involved, one in which possibility of misadventure was great. And it needed careful monitoring and precautions from TNI leadership, and General Syahnakri came through."

Militia stop UN access to camps

Reuters - December 13, 1999

Joanne Collins, Kupang -- Pro-Jakarta militiamen armed with pistols and clubs threatened UN aid officials in Indonesian West Timor on Friday, preventing them from entering camps for East Timorese refugees.

"This is the fifth time we have been unsuccessful in extracting refugees from the camps here," said Aida Qara'een of the UN refugee agency UNHCR in the West Timor capital of Kupang.

Four aid workers, escorted by unarmed Indonesian police, were confronted by gangs of armed militiamen in two camps on the outskirts of Kupang.

One of the camps was a barracks for the Indonesian military, or TNI, where East Timorese TNI members and militiamen and their families are staying. "The militia have been bearing arms on three occasions, even though the military tell us they have disarmed them," Qara'een said.

The UNHCR estimates 28,000 East Timorese refugees remain in three camps on the fringes of Kupang. Because of the strong militia presence, the UN and non-governmental organisations only gained access to the camps for the first time two weeks ago, and have so far been largely foiled in efforts to repatriate refugees.

"We've had hardly any movement out of the camps, only 15 here or 20 there," said Yusuf Hassan, head of the UNHCR's Kupang operations.

Hassan said serious health problems had emerged in the camps due to a lack of medical care and had been compounded by the onset of the rainy season.

He said conditions at Tua Pukan camp, 28km from Kupang -- where 161 people have died since late September -- were the worst in West Timor.

"When we finally got access to the camps we discovered a one- year-old with diarrhoea and fever and that's when we realised medical problems were there and ... an emergency officer from the WHO (World Health Organisation) was sent in from Jakarta to investigate," he said.

A WHO source in Kupang said the mortality rate had halved since mobile health teams began working in the camps a week ago. "We have had local health department teams working in the camps and in fact, there have been no deaths reported in the last three days. Prior to that, the death rate was around four per day, then it dropped to around two per day," he said.

Ketut Indra Jaya, a doctor working in the camps with a German non governmental organisation, said diarrhoea, malaria and acute respiratory infections were the main causes of death, but cholera was also a danger.

"Most of the camp conditions are the same -- very bad sanitation, untreated water, very few latrines -- and with the wet season it will get worse," he said.

"We have seen cases of cholera in Atambua, not Kupang, but there is a possibility we could see some cases." The United Nations said impeded access was not the only problem it faced. Hassan said the militias were spreading propaganda in the camps to discourage people from returning home.

"We started an information campaign in mid-November, circulating leaflets ... and doing radio broadcasts about what the UN was doing and an update on East Timor about how hospitals and schools were re-opening," he said.

"There is so much misinformation in the camps, stories about how INTERFET (the International Force for East Timor) is separating men and women and that returnees are getting killed." An estimated 250,000 East Timorese fled or were forcibly moved to West Timor in September amid a campaign of violence mounted by the militias and Indonesian military following East Timor's overwhelming vote for independence.

Aceh/West Papua

Troops avenge soldier's death

Agence France-Presse - December 17, 1999 (abridged)

Jakarta -- Indonesian police and soldiers set fire to dozens of houses and shops on Friday in the troubled Aceh province to avenge the killing of a soldier, a report said.

A soldier was found dead in the Lammeu area of Pidie district on Friday morning, prompting security authorities to send troops to the area to search for the assailants, the Detik online news service said.

Police and soldiers found homes in the area deserted by residents who had sought refuge in mosques in fear, Detik said. They torched shops and homes after failing to find the killer, it said.

Two civilians and one soldier were injured in violence Thursday between soldiers and rebels of the Free Aceh (GAM) separatist movement in the province, police sources said. The clash occured when troops raided a suspected GAM underground training facility in Blang Pante village in the Matangkuli area of North Aceh.

Police in Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, told AFP they knew about the incident from the military command based in North Aceh. "We've received reports about a raid on a GAM underground training facility in Blang Pante village by some 40 military personnel," an officer with the Banda Aceh police information office told AFP on condition of anonymity.

Banda Aceh's Serambi newspaper said troops involved in the raid were later ambushed by rebels as they crossed a bridge, which was blown up. It said one soldier broke his arm while jumping from a truck. The ambush prompted a massive sweep by troops, who later beat up two men from another village in the area.

Some 1,000 residents from six nearby villages left their homes and sought shelter at the Paya Bakong grand mosque in Matangkuli after troops entered their villages on Thursday, Serambi reported. The newspaper also reported claims by villagers the troops burned at at least 28 stores. The military denied the charges.

Parliament backs off referendum

South China Morning Post - December 16, 1999

Reuters in Jakarta -- Indonesia's parliament on Thursday backed away from the idea of allowing any referendum for the troubled province of Aceh.

Separatists are demanding a referendum on independence for the Sumatran region and a special parliamentary committee earlier recommended holding a vote of some kind in the province.

But on Thursday the full parliament specifically excluded this recommendation when it ratified other decisions by the panel. A copy of the final motion said the government needs to hold further talks on a referendum with parliament and the Acehnese. The decision now goes to President Abdurrahman Wahid for consideration and is non-binding.

Many Indonesians fear independence for Aceh will trigger the break-up of their country. The powerful military has vowed to resist any attempt by Aceh to break away.

Mr Wahid has suggested a vote on the implementation of Islamic Sharia law should be held in Aceh, but many groups in the province say they will reject any referendum that does not include the option of independence.

The committee's earlier recommendation did not specify what kind of referendum should be held. The recommendation also urged the government to speed the prosecution of anyone suspected of abuses in Aceh and to pay compensation for victims of atrocities in the territory.

Seven injured in violence

Jakarta Post - December 13, 1999

Associated Press, Banda Aceh -- Violence again marred the fasting month of Ramadhan in Aceh as three students and four police personnel were severely injured in separate incidents in Jeumpa Aceh regency over the weekend.

A doctor at the Merdu subdistrict community health center in Aceh Jeumpa regency, Farhad, said on Sunday he admitted Second Sgt. Irvan, Second Sgt. Harry Triantoro and privates Eddy Agus and Sulaeman to a hospital in the neighboring regency of Sigli.

He said the four members of the Police Mobile Brigade were shot during an ambush by an unidentified group at about 2pm local time. They were near Pulau Baru village on the highway linking Aceh's capital of Banda Aceh and North Sumatra's capital Medan.

Witnesses said that a group of police later combed the village for the assailants. The police burned at least 12 houses and arrested dozens of people during the operation, they said. Public transportation in the regency came to a standstill after the incident.

The violence followed the shooting of three students in North Aceh on Saturday night. Rahmat Yahya, Putra Juanda and Said Mahfud Zikri were shot after failing to stop at a roadblock in front of the Peulsangan Police station.

Head of Peulsangan Police subprecinct Second Lt. Vredom confirmed the shooting and visited the three students shortly after they were admitted to Bireun Hospital, some five kilometers from the site of the incident.

The three have been transferred to Banda Aceh General Hospital. A member of the hospital's staff said that Rahmat suffered a wound to his back and both of his arms were broken. He said one of Rahmat's arms may be amputated. Putra was shot in the chest, while a bullet grazed Said's left temple.

Witnesses said that the three students, who were returning from the Islamic Students Association (HMI) congress in Jambi, were speeding in their Kijang van.

"The driver put on the brakes abruptly to avoid the barricade. Suddenly the police fired shots at the van," an eyewitness, who insisted on anonymity, said.

AFP quoted Capt. Muryanto of the North Aceh Police as saying that an armed civilian was shot dead and three others wounded in the Matang Geulumpangdua subdistrict Violence continued in the predominantly Muslim province despite appeals from all sides to exercise restraint during the fasting month.

Data from the Sadar Rencong II Aceh Police information post revealed that at least three police personnel were killed, two severely injured and two others abducted during the last 10 days. "The armed group has killed and kidnapped our personnel. We have yet to find the two abducted members, who possibly have been killed," the post commander, Maj. Sayed Hoesainy, said as quoted by Antara on Saturday.

Sayed said 35 police personnel were killed, 12 kidnapped and 34 severely injured in the last eight months. In addition, 40 soldiers were murdered, 64 severely wounded and seven abducted in the same period, he said.

The chairman of the provincial chapter of the National Commission on Human Rights, Iqbal Farabi, urged civilians and the military on Saturday to use International Human Rights Day, which fell on Dec. 10, as the impetus to end violence in Aceh.

"Both the military and the civilian armed group should stop their enmity because too many innocent people have fallen victim to their dispute," he said.

Aceh has been home to a growing clamor for independence and a separatist campaign waged by the Free Aceh Movement. President Abdurrahman Wahid has rejected the possibility of provinces seceding from the country.

In a televised interview on Sunday, Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew said Aceh would be a regional pariah if it declared independence.

"Can it have international relations, trade and an international voice? No country in Southeast Asia will recognize it," Lee said in a CNBC Asia TV interview, the text of which was provided to The Associated Press.

News & issues

Generals to be tried for atrocities

Sydney Morning Herald - December 16, 1999 (abridged)

Daniel Cooney, Jakarta -- State investigators demanded yesterday that army generals be tried for human rights abuses in East Timor after President Abdurrahman Wahid said he would not block their prosecutions by the Indonesian courts.

Government human rights investigators said military commanders should be held accountable for the orgy of murder and destruction three months ago since they knew it was taking place and did nothing to prevent it.

"This is great news," said Mr Asmara Nababan of the Investigative Commission for Human Rights Abuses in East Timor. "We have enough evidence to go ahead with the prosecutions." Mr Wahid said yesterday he would not interfere in the judicial process and would allow the courts to decide the fate of the generals, including his senior minister for security and political affairs, General Wiranto, who was military chief during the East Timor crisis.

"I will not be swayed by any temptation," Mr Wahid said. "What is important is that we accept the decision of the court." Mr Wahid's comments appear to be at odds with those made by the Defence Minister, Mr Juwono Sudarsono, last week who said the generals would escape prosecution "as they were just carrying out State policy".

Mr Sudarsono said only lower-ranking soldiers who committed the actual crimes would be prosecuted.

Mr Nababan said the investigative commission would soon submit its recommendations to Indonesia's attorney-general, who will decide whether any generals should face charges.

Although Mr Wahid's new reformist Government appears intent on allowing Indonesia's own courts to decide the fate of the generals, it has repeatedly said they must not be tried by a proposed UN war crimes tribunal.

Last week, UN human rights investigators visited Jakarta, after spending nine days in East Timor gathering evidence of atrocities.

The team will present its report to the UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, before the end of the year. The UN Security Council will then decide whether to establish a tribunal, similar to those established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Probe may spark military backlash

South China Morning Post - December 16, 1999

Vaudine England, Jakarta -- The armed forces are smarting under a welter of rights abuse allegations. They have warned that local and international efforts to call the generals to account will not only fail but could threaten the nation's state of relative calm.

Armed forces chief Admiral Widodo said the military would extend moral support to accused generals: "TNI [the armed forces] will give full moral support to the officers who will be summoned by the human rights investigation commission.

"TNI appreciates efforts to uphold the law. The summons of the generals should be done in accordance with the principles of presumption of innocence ... They only implemented the state's duty." Former military chief General Wiranto, who is now President Abdurrahman Wahid's Co-ordinating Minister for Politics and Security, is more direct, saying simply that claims by the unusually forthright Indonesian Human Rights Commission regarding military behaviour in East Timor are "groundless".

"We expected the government-sponsored commission to work honestly and accurately, but ... what the commission has revealed to the public it is excessive and has gone beyond the judicial process," he said.

Political analysts are divided on whether the comments are the last gasps from an increasingly weakened institution or the portents of a military backlash against the growing openness and criticism now heard throughout Indonesia.

"You've got to be careful about putting these generals in a corner," a Western military expert said. "They might react." Plans by Indonesian legislators to question senior officers over rights abuses provoked the head of the Kostrad elite army force, Lieutenant General Jaja Suparman, to suggest such moves, which have already exceeded "the limits of fairness", could lead soldiers to act "wantonly".

General Wiranto has formed a special team of lawyers to prepare his defence, led by renowned human rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution, which plans to carry out its own investigations in West and East Timor to counter the allegations.

A nongovernmental human rights organisation said yesterday it had found new evidence linking Indonesian army generals to atrocities in East Timor.

Munir, a member of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, said new evidence directly linked the formation and growth of pro-Jakarta militia groups with the military.

The army's top generals, including General Wiranto, have denied ordering the violence or that the military stirred up trouble in Aceh as a deliberate ploy to keep troops there.

Meanwhile, both the evidence and pressure on the Government to follow through with investigation findings are mounting.

An independent commission investigating human rights abuses in Aceh province yesterday urged the Government to open a trial as soon as possible.

Commission chief Amran Zamzami said the team had pressed Mr Wahid to hold swift trials in five documented cases of abuses which they presented to him six weeks ago.

Protesters attack rubber plantation

Associated Press - December 16, 1999

Jakarta -- Dozens of policemen in Central Java were injured in two days of protests by villagers trying to attack a rubber plantation, the official Antara news agency said Thursday.

Two police trucks were set ablaze on Wednesday along with a police post and a telecommunication center at the Ciseru-Cipari plantation in Cilacap, about 270 kilometers southeast of the capital.

The protests were sparked by a dispute over land owned by the plantation but farmed by local villagers, Antara said.

Several dozens officers were hurt when the villagers attacked a group of riot policemen sent to the area following Tuesday attack.

About 2,000 workers of the plant -- the biggest rubber processing plant in central Java -- had to be evacuated because of the violence, the report said.

Elsewhere, at least one person was killed and 16 injured in a mob attack on a Christian foster-child and rehabilitation home in Jakarta, police said Thursday.

Hundreds of attackers stormed and looted the center in eastern Jakarta on Wednesday night and then burned it down, said Maj. Gen. Noegroho Djajoesman, chief of Jakarta Police.

A guard at the center was stabbed to death. The children escaped unhurt and were evacuated to Jakarta police headquarters. Djajoesman said six people have been held for questioning. The Christian-based Doulos Foundation serves 3,000 foster children nationwide, with more than 100 elderly mental patients and about 50 youths being treated for drug problems.

Reformasi in Bandung

Asiaweek - December 12, 1999

Yasmin Ghahremani and Tom Mccawley, Bandung -- The prosperous, tree-lined streets of Bandung hearken back to an era earlier this century when the city was known as the Paris of Java. Dutch colonial administrators at that time enlisted European architects and town planners to transform Bandung into an elegant holiday destination dotted with Art Deco buildings and other designs of the day.

This heritage, along with cool mountain air, makes the city of 1.8 million people the envy of other large Indonesian centers. Hotels are packed with crowds fleeing Jakarta during weekends. "A lot of government big-shots like to come here and whoop it up," says Rus Edi, a taxi driver.

But a few years ago, it looked like all this was in danger of going the way of the Dutch, as unbridled development ate away at Bandung's colonial charm and blanketed it in a layer of blue haze.

"It all started with the deregulation of the banks in the late 1980s," says Frances Effendi of the Bandung Heritage Society. Foreign investment began to pour in and the region took off. Soon a middle class emerged, and with it came Western-style suburbs -- one of them built on a water catchment area, causing nearby slums to flood during the rainy season. Jakarta-based property developers were allowed to ride roughshod over building regulations. Old theaters which used to screen silent movies were knocked down to make way for shopping centers, as was the 1871 jail in which a young Sukarno wrote angry anti-colonial pamphlets. Poor planning led to over-crowded, traffic-clogged streets.

Critics blame many of the city's social ills on the commando mentality of past leaders. Bandung is a garrison town and most of its mayors in the past 20 years have been military men. "They don't study social welfare or town planning in the army," says one housing activist. "They study territorial strategy and warfare."

Corruption was rampant. Regional elections were rigged, with village and neighborhood heads intimidating citizens into voting for the military candidates. The local parliament, known as the DPRD, did not regulate the civil service properly. A national culture of fear under former president Suharto kept many people silent. "They were afraid of intimidation," says activist Airanto.

But the tide appears to be turning in Bandung. Civilians are reclaiming their town, thanks in part to the reformasi that swept the nation after Suharto's fall last year. The country's first open ballot in 32 years helped the city usher in a new, fairly elected DPRD in June, which has approval rights over all mayoral candidates.

Increased freedom of speech now give Bandung's community activists and media a greater voice in exposing corruption among property developers and city officials. And new regulations on regional autonomy mean the Bandung government can for the first time raise its own revenue to build the roads and infrastructure it needs to ease congestion.

"Decentralization implies real participation of the civil society and the private sector," says Oliver Auge of GTZ, a German development agency setting up a solid waste management system in town. "And that is what we feel has been happening in Bandung to a somewhat greater extent compared to other cities in Indonesia."

Witness a slew of innovative improvement schemes, the GTZ project among them. The program employs 5,000 laborers to gather plastic rubbish and deposit it at a recycling center, tackling two social problems in one go. Another program, the Community Development Infrastructure Scheme, has won international recognition for its success in getting neighborhoods involved in planning and infrastructure. A similar initiative, devised by the previous mayor, Wahyu Hamijaya, gives district sub-divisions money for small-scale infrastructure projects such as wells, water pipes, paths and sewage. "The concept is based on empowering local communities," says Kamalia Purbani, an official of the Bandung urban planning bureau.

The Heritage Society has also been making progress, after years of less-than-affectionate protests over the destruction of buildings that should have been protected by law. "Money changed hands somewhere," says Muchtaram Karyadi, professor of urban planning at the Bandung Institute of Technology. But the society has managed to persuade several banks to buy heritage buildings and pay for their restoration. The local Bank NISP and Japan's Daiwa Securities have bought 1920s-era homes and turned them into regional branches.

Bandung has prosperity on its side too. The '90s boom greatly improved the material well-being of residents. The economy grew by 10% every year, a third higher than the national average. And it wasn't just the middle and upper classes that got richer. Workers benefited too. Bandung's industries -- textiles, garments, tea and coffee -- needed armies of labor. Rising wages attracted thousands from neighboring regions.

The challenge now, municipal leaders know, is to harness that material wealth and make it work for the citizens, not against them. Officials in many government departments are feeling upbeat. "To be honest, most of the steps forward have come since reformasi," says one senior bureaucrat. "People are more critical, and we have to be more careful." That is crucial if Bandung is to keep what charm it has left.

Rise of Islam-based 'vigilantes'

InterPress Service - December 13, 1999

Kafil Yamin, Jakarta -- Surya Sunjaya, who has been in the "entertainment business" for 23 years and is suspected to run a drug operation as well, is not afraid of police operations. He can face any bust by the police force, he says, because he knows he can "make a deal" with them.

But there is another force he would run away from -- the "santri" led by students of traditional Muslim boarding schools, which are responsible for a string of action, some of them violent, against perceived moral decadence.

"Dealing with the police is easy. Meet them and give them some money, and business is done," Surya said, referring to corrupt law enforcers. "Even when you face 'clean' police officers, you can still bear the risk because they won't destroy your things. They uphold the rules." But santris are uncompromising, as Surya himself found out last week.

On December 7, his restaurant was attacked, stoned and burned down by some 250 santris who call themselves "Hizbullah" (the Allah forces). Damage was estimated at 5 billion rupiah (215,000 US dollars).

The attack was carried by the santri because of widespread belief that Surya's "restaurant" was more than just that. Community residents say that every Saturday night, Surya's restaurant changes into a discotheque, and trade in illegal drugs goes on.

The police came to the site after the attack, and did nothing. The local police chief, Lt Col Bambang Sudarisman, gave what has become a standard reply in such situations: "We thank the 'santris' for their concern in this crime. But they took the law into their own hands -- that's another cause for our concern." The santris' rise to their "law enforcer" role has been prompted by the rapid and widespread growth of narcotics trade in Indonesia, a trend that worries community and religious leaders, as well as other social ills and crimes.

"Santri come forward [to take over the police role] because there is no institution and force to trust in attempt to curb the drug use," said K H Anang, leader of the Suryalaya boarding school.

Zainal Abidin, senior lecturer at the Bandung-based State Islamic Institute or IAIN, says that history shows that the santri normally emerges "when society is under threat of moral decadence, evil and other forms of sinful deeds and wickedness". Many santri in fact believe they are acting based on Islam, as the Koran says "When you see an evil, then do something", say social experts.

During the last three months, huge rallies by santri and other Muslim groups have been common scenes in some major cities of Indonesia. The rallies were usually followed by anti-drug "operations", some of which became violent.

Figures of santri operations so far are hard to come by, but attacks on discos and nightsports regularly make it to media headlines. Common estimates put the number of drug users at 13 million, a figure that law enforcers believe to be rising by four percent a year.

Many believe that the police have not been serious in attempts to curb crime. Worse, reports of police and military involvement in drug abuse and trafficking have also been increasing. No less than President Abdurrahman Wahid has rebuked corrupt police officials, vowing heavy punishment.

Just recently, at least 97 members of East Java provincial police were suspected of being drug users, police officials said. Seven are being tried on drug charges, while one has been found guilty and sentenced to four years in jail.

The problem is such that according to East Java Police Chief M Dayat, even in the police academy in Porong, several cadets were suspected of being drug users. One cadet is being interrogated and blood tests of 64 others have found traces of illegal substances.

These do little for the already notorious reputation of corrupt policemen, who are known also to protect prostitution networks -- the object of the santris's ire as well.

In Tangerang, hundreds of santri raided and burned 25 dimly lit kiosks, which they believed has been used as prostitution dens at Sungai Tahang, Selembaran Jati village.

In this incident, the police tried to block the mob from the attack, but one of the attackers slipped through the barricade, poured gasoline and set fire to one of the kiosks.

There are millions of "pesantren" (Muslim boarding schools) around the country, and many of their students also have martial arts skills. Already, criminals may be thinking twice about going ahead with their "businesses'.

But the emergence of groups that take the law into their own hands because of their perception that Indonesian society is losing its way, has caused worries about the rule of law. Already, casual traders are scared to keep their stores open when santris are on operations. Likeise, there is concern that vigilante-type groups could easily become abusive.

"If people think that they can resort to violence in dealing with their problems, then we are facing doomsday," said Hotma Sitompoel, a noted lawyer.

"Public utilities are destroyed. Traffic signs were ignored. And ethics are deserted because violence outweighs everything," he said, warning of anarchy. "Then why should we go to school? Why should we go to the mosques or churches?" He disputed the opinion that violence can be resorted to when the law does not work. "If you find the law does not work, make it work."

Arms/Armed forces

Warning on Jakarta arms trade

The Age (Melbourne) - December 15, 1999

Paul Daley, Canberra -- Continued European bans on arms sales will seriously hamper Indonesia's "internal repression" but could prompt Jakarta to forge new military relationships with China and Russia, a top-secret Australian intelligence paper reveals.

The secret assessment, obtained by The Age, predicts that continued sanctions by the European Union would seriously impede major Indonesian technical defence upgrades and have a "further debilitating impact" on the operational abilities of the Indonesian military (TNI).

The assessment, prepared by the Defence Intelligence Organisation and marked AUSTEO (Australian Eyes Only), points out that a number of EU countries reluctantly agreed to the ban.

This raised the prospect that Europe would once again arm TNI ahead of expected internal conflicts in the Indonesian provinces of Aceh, Ambon and Irian Jaya.

Defence, intelligence and diplomatic sources say the very existence of the document shows it is imperative that the EU, which imposed a four-month arms embargo on Indonesia in September, continues the ban when it is reconsidered on 17 January.

The document makes it clear that some EU members will put financial gain ahead of human rights, saying some countries "only gave lukewarm support to the embargo and insisted on the inclusion of the four-month sunset clause".

The EU embargo covers the export of arms and munitions as well as equipment that could be used for internal repression in Aceh, Irian Jaya and Ambon. It affected the planned sale of nine Hawk aircraft to Indonesia by Britain, which had previously delivered about 40 of the planes to the Indonesian military.

The British Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, and his Foreign Secretary, Mr Robin Cook, were embarrassed earlier this year with the revelation that Indonesia had used four of the jets (despite assurances to the contrary) in East Timor.

The Defence Intelligence Organisation document says an extended EU embargo is likely to affect major Indonesian defence acquisitions, including a Netherlands-provided signal system for Indonesia's 57-metre patrol boats, up to 70 special armored personnel carriers and 18 reconnaissance vehicles from the French, and possibly a consignment of 105mm light guns from Britain.

Extension of the ban would impact most heavily on the operational side of TNI and its ability to oversee internal repression. "The arms embargo, particularly if extended, may compel Indonesia to look to more `dependable' states such as China and Russia for military equipment," the assessment says. Diplomatic sources said that while the Prime Minister, Mr John Howard, had no intention of reversing the decision to downgrade Australian defence ties with Indonesia, Australia would not officially lobby EU countries to extend their arms embargo.

TNI's territorial structures natural to many

Jakarta Post - December 14, 1999

Asip Agus Hasani, Yogyakarta -- One manifestation of the military's dwi fungsi or dual function are its territorial institutions which span from provincial to village level: Military regional commands (Kodam), military resort commands and district commands at the regional level (Kodim), district level commands (Koramil) and village guidance bodies (Babinsa), comprising noncommissioned officers in the villages make up these territorial institutions.

In the midst of demands to scrap the social and political function of soldiers, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is striving to redefine its dual function doctrine, saying it is still vital for, among other things, maintaining the unity of the nation.

The Jakarta Post recently talked to lecturer Cornelis Lay of Gadjah Mada University (UGM) on this issue. Following is an excerpt of the interview:

Question: The military's institutions are justified by the dual function doctrine. People do not seem to be bothered by them despite calls to scrap the doctrine.

Answer: These territorial institutions, from Kodam to Babinsa level, are indeed expressions of the military's social and political role. Public opinion polls shows very strongly that people accept such institutions. People consider the Kodam and its lower structures to be natural places for soldiers. They do not think the existence of those institutions, which are manifestations of its dual function should be questioned. Only a few people among the educated class strongly resist those institutions.

I base my statement on the preliminary results of research by UGM's inter-university center (PAU) on social issues in which I am involved. The results of the survey and interviews clearly reveal that 78 percent of 5,000 respondents accept the military's territorial institutions.

Only there are different degrees of acceptances -- the further the territorial institution from people, the higher the acceptance. So acceptance of the Kodam at the provincial level rated highest, while the presence of the Babinsa in villages was the least accepted, by 54 percent of respondents.

The most common reason given was that territorial institutions were where soldiers belonged and nothing needed to be questioned about that. Respondents questioned soldiers or officers becoming regents, governors, village heads and taking other positions, but they could accept the territorial institutions. What is the real effect of these institutions on civilian political life? Politically it's easy to see in various areas that the presence of the territorial structure has become a powerful and decisive force in determining the local political scene. The power of a Kodam is obviously greater than that of the governor.

At the lower level, a regional military commander is more powerful than the regent. And if the regent is a military man too they will combine into a very powerful conspirational force.

The influence of military territorial officers is reflected in the political decision making and in determining which people hold local political posts. It is very easy for officers to determine who will become regent, who will become regional secretary, the provincial head of a ministry and so forth. The capability of these military officers in such things far surpasses other local politicians.

This has produced an extraordinary imbalance among local political institutions. Another political implication is the creation of what is called "local military structures" parallel to the civilian bureaucracy.

Everywhere in Indonesia, all levels of local bureaucracies are accompanied or politically overshadowed by the bureaucracy of the military's territorial institutions. The Babinsa is parallel to the village head; the Koramil to the district head and so on. Those military officers mainly have the function of control.

Such institutional parallelism has had serious implications to civilian political life, which is systematically controlled 24 hours-a-day by a very tight military structure through local soldiers in the midst of civilian life.

Actually such an implication does not only affect civilians; it also affects local political institutions and the civilian bureaucracy.

What about the implications on the local economy?

In military and political affairs the hierarchy is evident; the Kodim has very tight and strong control of the Koramil. But this hierarchy does not operate in economy and business.

The result is that all territorial institutions from top to bottom, even their battle units, become very independent "business empires." So it is quite likely that they will target their income from the same source.

For instance one Kodam [could gain income] through its cooperative, its generals or its business group -- whether a normal business, a security business, a black-market operation, a gambling operation or others. So one privately-owned firm could be practically besieged by soldiers from different levels in the hierarchy; one company would have to pay such amount of money to the Kodim, another amount to the Koramil for back up etc.

This results in extraordinary economic distortion because production costs become very high, which is then a burden on all consumers. Furthermore there are very strong indications in a number of areas of the deep involvement of the military in illegal businesses.

In gambling, for instance, from sophisticated forms to those like cock fighting, you are likely to find soldiers supporting the business. The same goes for drugs. The flourishing black- market is indirectly because of the presence of soldiers and their territorial institutions. In Kupang, for instance, soldiers are allegedly behind the illicit trafficking of goods, likewise in East Nusa Tenggara; in Kalimantan soldiers have reportedly been found to be involved in timber thefts and more.

Would you say the dual function doctrine has only been a mask for soldiers' economic interests?

There are indeed strong indications that the degree of will on the part of the military to intervene in local politics is determined by local economic potential. Where an area has a high economic potential, soldiers will control the local political structure. All across Java the governor cannot be separated from the military, or at the least he is someone they can control. Riau, North Sumatra and other areas with economic potential have always been dominated by the military.

Bali is an interesting example. In the early 1970s when Kuta beach began showing big economic potential the military suddenly became involved. This was evident from the election of the regent who was from the military, whereas previously the military did not care a bit about Kuta. This continues today and [military involvement] has become hard to let go, while soldiers are eying different positions in Kuta.

The main conclusion here is a suspicion that military involvement in politics may be more determined by economic interests rather than political and ideological considerations which they claim, like communist threats, national stability and others.

What is the influence of the institutions on local social and cultural life?

Maybe only 60% of soldiers in the institutions stay in military camps, the rest stay in civilian settlements. This has posed difficulties for people, because the military members are not supervised 24 hours-a-day, they're free to go out after their work hours. The most problematic thing for locals is when a dispute occurs among villagers.

For instance, if a village where a military member stays is caught up in a dispute with another village, the military will be used to frighten the other side. Military members are often brought into land disputes which can lead to unfair decisions in court.

All this results in an escalation of conflict from time to time. Furthermore, it has turned out that escalations like this can spread to other units within the TNI and the National Police, if, for instance, one side is supported by the Army and the other is supported by the Police Mobile Brigade or the Air Force. This frequently happens in local areas.

Have the territorial institutions been found to be involved in the settlement of crime, something which is actually under the police's authority?

Yes, this is very important. In many areas we find that territorial institutions are involved in handling public order cases, like those involving young delinquents. However, their involvement has complicated things even more. For example, if a gang of youngsters are caught committing crimes or engaged in an intergang fight. Those caught by soldiers from the Kodim may well be treated harshly during their detention.

But the ridiculous thing is that they will feel proud and compare themselves with the rival gang whose members were only arrested by the police, which is considered lower in prestige. Then those who were only arrested by the police will be encouraged to commit more serious crimes so they can be caught by soldiers.

This leads to an escalation of social problems in the younger generation and at the same time causes the police, who should uphold the law and maintain law and order, to lose their authority entirely. So once again, the high level of violence in society is a logical consequence of the presence of territorial institutions which intervene in civilian's daily life.

The presence of territorial institutions also poses a problem when used by government offices which feel they cannot complete a program without the help of the military and its ability to use force. The most clear example here is the National Family Planning Board (BKKBN); because [officials] could not make people come to listen to lectures and take part in the family planning program they asked for the military's help.

Their method was to use the health section of the Armed Forces in Villages program (AMD). This practice may not have been too prevalent in Java, but outside Java this was normal. There was no persuasion in the family planning program [in such areas]. Outside Java such practices caused extraordinary panic. It distanced the government from the people.

Similar things happened in the implementation of programs from the ministry of agriculture. Soldiers were used to force farmers to use new types of fertilizers, new technology and to force people to leave their homes because a dike or another project was planned on their land.

The presence of the military in areas through territorial institutions has led to many social complications. And it has greatly burdened civilians. Meanwhile people have begun to believe -- at least they have become used to -- the use of violence to settle disputes, and people have become used to soldiers and they don't trust any other party. This alone results in a negative culture.

What makes people accept military territorial institutions?

I don't know for sure, maybe they have been around so long we have become used to their presence, and also to their negative implications. But clearly the continuing, systematic ideological process regarding the military's social and political role has been profoundly powerful, to the extent that society does not realize what should have been, or what should be the case.

People do not consider the presence of a Korem strange; it has been there for ages. People accept it as it is. They can complain of its negative influences but they do not know that the source is the territorial institution. People complain about soldiers supporting cock fighting but they do not think that if the Babinsa or Koramil weren't there, the support for such activities would not be there either.

Do TNI senior officials realize that the military, through territorial institutions, make things worse in the regions?

Many soldiers still think the appearance of social and political problems in various regions is a sign of disintegration and an absence of military territorial institutions in those areas. This is visible from their response when Aceh heated up; they proposed the establishment of a military command in Aceh.

In Maluku the Kodam was activated, in West Kalimantan a Kodam was planned and in East Nusa Tenggara even the district police station was to be made into a Korem.

So they think that a military territorial institution is the solution to all regional problems. This is a serious problem regarding our military.

Instead, it is their presence which is the source of the social and political problems. More so because their presence has failed to catch up with political developments. For instance, many areas do not have a regional commander while officers in the same area have become the speaker of the local legislature or the regent. So the military is greatly lacking in officers. But they have a surplus of officers to fill in political positions, that is what is absurd.

The military's jargon has it that the TNI is the nation's dinamisator [dynamist], stabilisator [stabilizer], integrator and a host of other things. But their territorial institutions have become a source of disasters in many areas because of the use of violence in settling problems.

Would you say the institutions have contributed to disintegration movements in a number of areas?

Not directly, but indirectly yes. Disintegration movements are accumulative responses to military actions, reflected in such resistance. Excessive and irresponsible use of violence by security forces at the lower level would not have happened if there were no powerful institutions protecting them, and in most cases such institutions are the military's territorial ones.

Has too deep a military involvement in civilian life led to people's hatred toward the government in general?

We cannot possibly build respect for state institutions by upholding the law with violence. I think Aceh's experience is a concrete example which shows there are limits to the use of force, particularly in imposing public obedience or loyalty to the state.

If we learned a good lesson from the experience, we should have discarded our former belief that we need strong battle units across the archipelago. This is why the eradication of these territorial military institutions from the Kodam downwards is terribly important. Or to avoid a shake up in the military which could spread to national politics, at least we could start with the eradication of the Babinsa at the village and the Koramil at the district level.

What should be prepared for when military territorial institutions are done away with?

We must strengthen our police. Police personnel must be added and they should be placed right down to the village level. But what is also important is that the police are trained to become real police officers. If it's only police substituting for soldiers this would be worse, because all this time their authority has been trampled on and their behavior has become like the soldiers. The TNI has often promised to discipline its members implicated in crime and other undisciplined acts ...

I do not believe in disciplining individual members because it must be done institutionally. If we say "arrest corporal A" who is involved in an illegal business, this would not resolve anything, because "A's" behavior is as a result of interests based on the entire military institution. A sergeant would not dare to back up an illegal business if he did not represent a powerful institution like the Kodim for instance.

So the eradication of territorial institutions is a must if we want a better political life in the future. In fact, there should be an all-out purge of military institutions including the so- called Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs in the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as their subordinate offices. They are wasting their energy and funds, their only job is to screen people and watch over civil servants.

A further [target] is the "conspiring oligarchy organization" in civilian bureaucracies which manifests itself in the Muspida [regional consultative councils] where the military always dominate decision making. [The Muspida should] deliver public policy in the provinces or regions to governors and regents who have been elected democratically at the local level.

Do you agree to the gradual removal of territorial institutions? I do think [the eradication] should go through a stage by stage process ... if only to reduce its psychological impact and potential sociopolitical costs.

We can predict that a drastic eradication of the institutions would lead to demoralization on a large scale within TNI. This could lead to resistance, indiscipline, collective chaos, ethnic or religious disputes generated by disappointed soldiers.

While a phasing out is done, the government must also prepare the necessary infrastructure. We do not know what the project of "returning the military to the barracks" will be like. What if we return them to their dormitories, while the buildings are not in decent condition? Respectable dormitories, decent wages, a decent budget and other things must be prepared.

At the same time, their curricula must be changed. They must be prepared to become military professionals. So there will be an outgoing generation and a new generation growing up and educated in another way.

What would be an ideal budget for the military?

We cannot fix a [figure] to say what is ideal. What is clear is that all this time they have controlled unlimited economic resources. If all these resources were converted into tax for the government, part of which would then be allocated to the military, the money would be enough for military needs.

And what senior TNI officials have forgotten is that we don't want to produce rich officers. The difference is as follows: If we can implant a new way of thinking within the military, success would not be measured in the number or luxuriousness of the generals' houses, but if military units have sophisticated equipment.

Show me a poor general, while military units have limited means and poor equipment. Outdated weaponry and old equipment mean our military is among the most backward in the world.

The passage of secrets

Australian Financial Review - December 13, 1999

Brian Toohey -- Not so long ago, Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim had good reason to smile when he saw a member of the Australian embassy enter his Jakarta headquarters. He could be fairly confident the visitor was bearing gifts. Anwar had little to offer in return, but this did not diminish the Australians' determination to prove they were generous allies.

Anwar headed the Indonesian military's main intelligence body, BIA (Armed Forces Intelligence Body). The Australian visitors were not calling as diplomats but as intelligence liaison officers. One of their most important jobs in Jakarta involved the hand delivery of highly sensitive intelligence material to BIA and its rival agency, the State Intelligence Co-ordinating Body (Bakin).

More limited liaison has occurred with the Co-ordination Body for the Consolidation of National Stability (Bakorstanas), often described as the intelligence wing of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order.

BIA reverted to its earlier name of BAIS (Body for Strategic Intelligence) shortly after Anwar left to become Special Adviser on East Timor to the then Defence Minister, General Wiranto, at the start of the year. Anwar is refusing to make himself available to a UN investigation into crimes against humanity in East Timor. But he has already been questioned by Indonesian investigators about his role in similar crimes in Aceh.

Even though it became clear over the course of the year that Anwar was co-ordinating a covert operation to wreck any chance of a peaceful transition to independence in East Timor, the flow of intelligence from Australia continued unabated until after the August 30 ballot. Military co-operation was cut back on September 10. Although it is widely assumed the flow of intelligence was also reduced, the Prime Minister, John Howard, says there will be no departure from the long-standing practice of refusing to comment on intelligence matters.

Given the sensitivity of the relationship, serving and recently retired intelligence officials are unwilling to speak on record. Privately, they say Indonesia began to be supplied during the Keating era with the sort of intelligence which would only have been swapped with Australia's long-term allies (mainly the United States and Britain) a few years earlier. Examples include satellite imagery as well as assessments based on top-secret electronic intercepts.

One reason for handing over this sort of material was to convince the Indonesians we wanted a special relationship by letting them put one foot in the door of what used to be an exclusive Anglo-Saxon "club" for swapping intelligence. The Indonesians had little to offer in return. A former intelligence official who helped supply this material says neither BAIS nor Bakin despite their official job descriptions are really interested in gathering strategic intelligence about the region, let alone passing it on to Australia. "Their job is really about the nitty gritty of maintaining support for the regime. They were always badgering us for stuff on East Timor or Indonesian students in Australia," he said.

So far as this source is aware, the Indonesians' demands for adverse material on dissidents were not met at least not through the normal liaison channels. But most members of the intelligence community don't know what is handed over via less formal channels at the behest of a minister or a senior official in the Foreign Affairs, Defence or Prime Minister's Department.

Any decision to hand over intelligence on internal security matters at this level can have ongoing political significance. Earlier this year, an official visitor to Jakarta says, he was told by a senior Indonesian minister that Australia supplied intercepted communications intelligence about military training of Achenese independence supporters in the 1980s. The much appreciated "gift", supposedly authorised at a ministerial level, was still seen as indicating Australian support for repressive measures to keep the rebellious province under Jakarta's control.

Staff in Australia's two main intelligence collection agencies, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), usually oppose handing over material that could endanger individuals. But they acknowledge that they lose control of information once it is passed on to ministers, departments and the main analytical agencies, the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA).

One intelligence gathering official says: "Anyone can quietly slip a document over at a meeting or a dinner. You don't have to be an accredited liaison officer. There were people further up the chain who passionately wanted [ex-president] Soeharto to stay in power. They didn't want to hear about whether people were tortured or murdered or whatever, so long as internal stability was assured. Even today, some would still be willing to see [the Political and Security Affairs Minister] General Wiranto take over if it helped stability. We simply don't know what, if anything, was handed over at higher levels."

Despite the decision to hand over the material on Aceh, the flow of intelligence from Australia in the 1980s was usually confined to more general information about events outside Indonesia. How far the volume and quality of the flow was expanded after Paul Keating became prime minister is unclear. Keating made his intentions plain at a press conference in Jakarta after a meeting with Soeharto in October 1993 when he said he was "very happy" with the first exercise which had recently been conducted between the Special Air Service and the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) and wanted similar co- operation to "spill over" into the intelligence area.

The official line is that co-operation increased without a substantive change in the nature of what was handed over. According to one highly placed intelligence official: "There was an attempt to implement what the PM wanted, no question about that. There were more frequent visits, more frequent exchanges, but there are also limits to how far you can go. You need to be careful about revealing your capabilities. You can hand over material on the South China Sea but you have to be careful in handing over detailed material on Indonesia itself." But another official says far more sensitive material was transmitted through the formal channels than previously.

The Nine Network's Sunday program gave an example of the increased level of co-operation in May when it showed a video of a plaque commemorating the visit of a DIO officer, Colonel Di Harris, to the Indonesian military's headquarters in Dili. While the Defence Department denies any Australian intelligence was handed over during the discussions, friendly contact with those controlling the repression on the ground in East Timor was not allowed before Keating upgraded the relationship.

Some younger intelligence officials question why we hand over other material from highly classified sources when we get so little in return. Less critical officials say we can't really expect to get much in return because over 90 per cent of the Indonesian intelligence relates to internal security where the detail is of little relevance for Australia.

Even in areas where a reciprocal relationship could be expected, little headway has been made. The most disappointing example involves requests for help in the mid-1990s when it became clear Indonesian boat operators were bringing illegal migrants into Australia. According to one official: "Basically, we got nothing. They didn't know or weren't saying. That's still the situation, as I understand it." This has not stopped the Australian Federal Police from hoping it might have better luck. An AFP officer spent several months in Jakarta earlier this year conducting a review of the Indonesian police's ability to handle criminal and intelligence information. At the same time, other AFP officers were working for the UN in East Timor where Indonesian police participated in the violence perpetrated by militia groups orchestrated by General Anwar.

According to the AFP, no decision has been made on what further involvement, if any, it will have in setting up a new intelligence handling system for the Indonesian police. The AFP anticipates a positive decision would lead to a better flow of information on people smuggling than ASIS managed. As well as problems of extensive corruption, however, the Indonesian police have an important role in suppressing dissent in provinces such as Aceh. Given the pernicious human rights record of their ultimate boss, Wiranto, any Australian decision to go ahead with building a new national intelligence data base for the police is likely to attract stiff opposition within Australia.

One Canberra-based intelligence analyst says: "You've got to realise all these bodies are intertwined, the police, Kopassus, BAIS, Bakin, Bakorstanas and so on. Their job is to maintain internal security. They pervade Indonesian society as strongly as the Stasi [secret police] in the old East Germany. And they're more ruthless than the Stasi ever dreamt of ." According to this analyst: "Our political masters should really be aware of who they are dealing with here. BAIS, or BIA as it used to be called, is a really nasty outfit. Everyone knows about Kopassus, but it's been up to its neck in torture too. You're really giving these bodies your imprimatur when you supply them with intelligence, even if it has no direct link to anyone getting arrested or tortured."

Others are more interested in questions of efficiency. While not approving of torture, a 1994 report from the then Australian Defence Attache in Jakarta, Brigadier Keith Mellor, contained no hint of criticism of what he called "the internal security apparatus". Mellor wrote that the "internal intelligence network and the means of dealing with internal security incidents continue to be capable of carrying out their mission in a timely and flexible manner ... [The] handling of internal security problems in Irian Jaya, East Timor and Aceh ... has been effective".

Democratic reformers in Indonesia would like to make the internal security apparatus much less effective and far more accountable. So far, however, there are few indications the power of the military and its pervasive intelligence agencies has waned since the election in October of Abdurrahman Wahid as President.

Until this happens, the supply of Australian intelligence to these agencies will remain a contentious issue. So will the unsuccessful hunt revealed in September to identify a senior Australian official whose alleged recruitment as a BAIS agent really brought a smile to Zacky Anwar's face.

Economy & investment

Government debt 71.9 billion

Agence France-Presse - December 18, 1999

Jakarta -- The offshore debt of the Indonesian government in the fiscal year ending next March is estimated to reach 71.9 billion dollars, a report said here Saturday.

"The government's overseas debt in the 1999/2000 fiscal year is estimated to reach 71.9 billion dollars or about 45% of gross domestic product," the chairman of the National Development Planning Baord Junaedy Hadisumarto, was quoted by the Jakarta Post as saying.

Junaedy said the foreign debt included a 10.3 billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund. He said the government's offshore debt in the previous fiscal year stood at 68.4 billion dollars or 58.6% of gross domestic product.

The majority of the foreign debt in the current fiscal year was to finance subsidy programs to help the poor to survive the economic crisis.

Junaedy also said the government's domestic public debt in the current fiscal year stood at another 74.7 billion dollars compared to 21.9 billion dollars in the previous fiscal year.

He attributed the large difference to the huge cost of the government's bank recapitalisation program. The program, to shore up the country's ailing banking sector, is estimated to cost more than 500 trillion rupiah (71 billion dollars,) officials have said. Part of the cost is hoped to be covered from government bonds.

GDP growth seen at 1.8 percent

Agence France Presse - December 17, 1999

Jakarta -- Indonesia should post Gross Domestic Product growth of 1.8% in the year to March 2000, according to a draft of the government's latest letter of intent to the IMF, obtained Friday.

GDP growth during the April to December 2000 transitional budget year was estimated at 3-4%, according to the draft dated November 24, obtained by AFX Asia, an AFP-affiliated financial news service. Economic expansion in 2001 was seen at 4-5% and 5- 6% in 2002.

The draft document is still being discussed by the government and International Monetary Fund negotiators but while some alterations will occur, many of the conditions are not to expected to change significantly, sources familiar with the talks said.

The draft letter sees inflation at 8-9% in the year to March 2000 compared with 64.7% a year earlier. It is expected to rise 3-4% in the April-December 2000 transitional budget. In 2001 and 2002, inflation is seen rising 4-5% per year.

The letter sees interest rates declining further but does not provide details. The letter did not forecast an exchange rate for the rupiah but uses a rate of 7,000 to the dollar in some calculations. The letter sees public debt to GDP at 89.1% in the April-December 2000 transitional budget, compared with 91.7% in the year to March 2000. Bank Indonesia's net foreign exchange reserves are seen at 16.2 billion in 2000, unchanged from late 1999.

The government expects the debt service ratio to be 34.8% in the year to March 2000, compared to 39.1% a year earlier. The ratio will fall to 29.8% in full-year 2000, 27.1% in 2001 and rise to 34.8% in 2002.

The goverment expects an external account surplus in the year to March 2000 of 5 billion dollars or about 3.2% of GDP. This would be 2.5 billion dollars above previous projections because of reduced fiscal expansion and stronger oil export prices, the letter said.

"With the onset of recovery and a strengthened currency, we expect the current account surplus to decline in 2000, consistent with the pattern experienced in other Asian countries," the letter said.

It said the current account surplus should fall to about 1.5 billion dollars in the April-December 2000 budget year. "Export volume growth should strengthen, although this is expected to be outweighed by a recovery of imports, which should still remain well below the pre-crisis level," the letter said.

It said there should be an external financing gap in the April-December 2000 budget year of about 4.3 billion dollars which will be linked to an expected budget deficit of about 5 billion dollars. The budget deficit is seen falling to 3.7 billion dollars in 2001 and 2.6 billion dollars in 2002.

"We have requested another principal rescheduling from the Group of Official Creditor Countries of Indonesia for the 24- month period through March 2002; estimated relief during financial year 2000 is 2.1 billion dollars," the letter said.

The IMF is coordinating a 46 billion dollar aid package to help Indonesia overcome its worst crisis in decades, in return for wide-ranging economic reforms and restructuring.

Econonomy shows signs of life

Far Eastern Economic Review - December 15, 1999

Dan Murphy, Jakarta -- Indonesia's economy is finally showing signs of life thanks to a peaceful presidential election, a new president who has proved acceptable to the majority of the Indonesian people, and black gold.

The defeat of B.J. Habibie in the October presidential election was seen as a necessary precondition to resumed investment by many in the Indonesian business community. Habibie was viewed by many Indonesians as an extension of Suharto, the former general who ruled for 32 years, and investors worried political turmoil could rise upon his election.

But the election of Abdurrahman Wahid has led to an immediate shift in mood, particularly in Jakarta. The five-star hotels are near capacity once more as foreign businessmen flock to Indonesia to inspect prospective investments and, in some cases, seal deals. In early December, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency reached an agreement with a foreign investment group to sell about 38% of vehicle maker Astra International, the biggest transaction yet agreed by the agency.

Analysts were in general agreement the deal couldn't have been closed before the election. It's hoped it will get the ball rolling on the sale of other assets seized from conglomerates that owe money to the state to cover the cost of the country's $80 billion bank bailout.

The impact of Wahid's victory isn't showing yet in the trade numbers or gross domestic product, which is forecast to either contract or grow by 1% this year. But the macroeconomic picture is improving, thanks to surging world oil prices and a recovery in domestic demand. Exports rose 2% in October from September to $4.58 billion as oil and gas exports rose 15% to $1.06 billion. Non-oil exports though -- a key indicator of the health of manufacturing -- remained flat at $3.54 billion.

The trade surplus jumped to $2.56 billion from $1.41 billion a year ago as imports continued to languish because of the weak rupiah. Even rising prices have been cause for cheer, indicating that consumers are less afraid to spend. Consumer prices, the key measure of inflation, rose 0.25% in November from the previous month, and is now up 1.75% year-on-year. Interest rates are at their lowest point in two years. The benchmark three-month government bill now yields about 13%.

But there are still daunting obstacles to recovery. In the first eight months, approved domestic investments fell by half to $2.8 billion, and approved foreign investment plunged 76% to $2.1 billion from a year earlier. Money may be trickling back but the chronically ill banking system could threaten economic stability.

Government debt is now $71 billion, and Finance Minster Bambang Sudibyo says 41 trillion rupiah will be spent servicing it next year. A further IDR37 trillion is expected to be spent on interest payments for recapitalization bonds the government has pumped into sick banks.