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Australian military ties with Indonesia

By Tony Burke

The dictator Suharto may have gone, but the powerful Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), under General Wiranto, are still in control and ready to protect Indonesia's ruling elite and their privileges.

ABRI has played an important role in suppressing the democracy movement and is a key player in Indonesia's political future. Despite the clear desire for genuine democracy from all levels of Indonesian society, the Howard Government refuses to end its support for Indonesia's repressive military. Australia continues to provide them with more training and support than any other nation. Even as students were being murdered and others tortured in secret locations in May 1998, Australia conducted joint naval exercises, New Horizon, which involved ships and aircraft from both nations in the Java sea.

When Suharto took power in 1965, he was an Army General and a former commander of the Kostrad Strategic Reserve. He supervised the archipelago-wide campaign of killings in which up to one million people were killed for their political beliefs. Another 500,000 were imprisoned for terms up to 13 years. The rapid deployment forces, RPKAD (Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat) Commander, Sarwo Edhie, a graduate of an Australian army training course in 1964, was one of the most aggressive officers, supervising and personally taking part in the vicious killings in Central Java in October 1965.

Australia's military aid to Indonesia

Interrupted only between 1986 and 1991, Australia has maintained a substantial military aid program to Indonesia which includes training officers, supplying aircraft and parts for the airforce, and conducting regular naval, air and land exercises. At the same time ABRI has controlled rigged elections, tortured and intimidated the population, invaded East Timor killing 200,000 people, and carried out massacres in West Papua, Aceh, East Timor, South Sumatra and Jakarta. Australia's training has assisted ABRI to conduct operations in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua, and during the riots and protests in Jakarta in May this year.

Australia's military training of Indonesia's military personnel increased overall after the US Congress cancelled the Pentagon's training programs with Indonesia after the November 1991 Dili massacre. ABRI Commander General Try Sutrisno visited Australia after the massacre where Labor Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, bragged that Australia would be happy to supply what the US would not. Between 1991 and 1997, the number of officers trained in Australia leapt from five to more than 400. They in turn pass those skills onto their own troops.

The Australian military has been closest to the Army's Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) and the Special Forces (Kopassus), both of which were commanded until recently by Suharto's son-in-law, Lt- Gen Prabowo Subianto.

Since 1994, the Australian Special Air Service (SAS) and Kopassus have held an annual exercise, "Night Komodo", in both Java and Western Australia. The 20,000 strong force is the most highly trained section of the Indonesian military, and has been at the forefront of operations in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh. Examples of the training Kopassus has received from the Australian SAS include rappelling out of helicopters, special communications training and advanced shooting drills. During the May 1998 protests Kopassus troops were seen rappelling from a helicopter into a Jakarta University, skills taught by the Australian military.

In March 1995, the Indonesian army was involved in a land exercise, "Swift Canopy '95", at the Shoalwater Bay training area. Indonesian airborne units also participated in Kangaroo '95. Regular exercises are also held between the two airforces and joint surveillance flights over Timor Gap are routine. Since 1994, at least two joint naval exercises have been held each year. Australia's training with Papua New Guinea has also assisted Indonesia. In 1989, there were media reports that the SAS was training members of the PNG Defence Force to capture, interrogate and kill Free Papua Movement guerrillas who were found in PNG.

10-year defence agreement signed

In December 1995, Suharto and Paul Keating signed the "Agreement on Maintaining Security" which provided for the Australian and Indonesian militaries to conduct joint operations. This agreement was drawn up in secrecy and only made public after its signing. In December 1996, the Australian and Indonesian defence ministers signed a 10-year "future directions" agreement, which projects further increases in training and exercises, logistics co- operation, intelligence exchanges, defence procurement and defence science and technology collaboration. A further objective is to increase " inter-operability" and improve "command and control" communications and procedures in order to strengthen ABRI's own combat organisation and to increase the ability of the two militaries to be deployed together in operations.

Despite objections from the Department of Foreign Affairs human rights section, in 1990 Australia exported Steyr semi-automatic rifles to Indonesia. Arms exports to Indonesia jumped from $2.5 million in 1994-5 to $10 million in 1995-6, which included over $500,000 worth of radio equipment and $80,000 worth of firearms. The Australian government also recently announced the sale of 20 Nomad aircraft to Indonesia, ostensibly for maritime surveillance.

The future directions mooted for strategic co-operation may also involve Australian scientists in the joint development of weapons and systems, which are not subject to any form of public accountability.

Australia trains Indonesian military

Currently Australia trains hundreds of Indonesian officers every year (with the objective that they will train their own troops in the techniques taught to them here), and has regular exercises with Kopassus and with Kostrad.

The rationale for the type of training offered by the Australian Defence Force is that these are the forces most likely to be involved in any external defence operation and never for internal security. Yet its clear these skills could be applied anywhere, and are more likely to be applied within Indonesia. This was also confirmed by a former Australian military attach in Jakarta who admitted that skills passed on by Australian instructors were being used in East Timor.

Australia's joint naval exercises

The most recent example of the joint co-operation was the naval military exercises, New Horizon, which took place off the coast of Surabaya, East Java during the unrest in mid-May. As Indonesian troops confronted student demonstrations and the occupation of the parliament, Indonesia's navy and airforce were engaging in joint military war games with the Australian military off the coast. For one week beginning May 16, nearly a third of the Royal Australian Navy, four of Australia's most powerful ships, the guided-missile frigates Canberra, Newcastle and Adelaide and the escort destroyer Torrens including 450 personnel and four Australian warplanes participated in the joint exercises. The Three F-111 fighter bombers were simulating attacks in ships while a Orion P3 maritime reconnaissance place was operational. A similar number of Indonesian ships were taking part. This operation took place off the coast of Indonesia at a particularly critical time.

In 1997 a group of 16 Australian Army commissioned and non- commissioned officers went to Indonesia to conduct a "training the trainers" program for the Indonesian Army. The group conducted a seven-week "Recruit Instructor Development Training" program from July 15 to August 31 for the Indonesian Army at the Physical Training Center in Cimahi, West Java. To prepare for the training, five Indonesian soldiers took part in an instructor's course and observed Australian recruit instruction techniques where the Australian military team were helping them apply the techniques to the training of Indonesia Army recruit instructors.

Behind the Australian defence co-operation plan

Australia's defence co-operation with Indonesia is being driven by two main policies. One is a shift in Australian defence policy in which there has been a rapid increase in defence co-operation and joint exercises with south-east Asian militaries to counter a perceived future threat from China and/or a dramatic reduction of US forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

The other policy is one in which Australia sees the Indonesian Army as being politically powerful, remaining so for many years, and being the key to any political change in the region. A close personal and structural relationship between the two militaries is seen as important for Australia's political influence with the Suharto regime and any successor -- its a form of diplomacy running parallel with (and just as important) as that between other areas of government. This leads Australian officials to see the military as being firmly in control, and they play down the significance of the opposition movement and are reluctant to develop public contacts with them, or speak up for them. Indeed the new Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, John McCarthy, along with foreign minister Alexander Downer, has argued Australia should take a low profile stance on human rights, even though countries like the US are becoming far more vocal.

Australia's economic and aid relationship with Indonesia

Australia's economic and aid relationship with Indonesia plays a crucial role in gaining legitimacy for the Indonesian government despite its well-documented human rights abuses. Trade between the two countries has grown substantially over the past few years with Australian levels of investment increasing and diversifying, from traditional areas such as mining to food, tourism, banking and legal services. At the end of 1996 Australia had total approved investment plans of US$5.9 billion, making it the ninth largest investor in Indonesia.

Maintaining access for Australian companies to Indonesian markets and influential political contacts is a significant motive for the approach the Australian government takes to Indonesia. There was however a point last year, after a series of flag burnings, when the Association of Indonesian Importers threatened to stop all imports from Australia unless the government expelled all Fretilin members, a significant factor in the reluctance of the Australian government to provide asylum to the East Timorese refugees. In July 1995, the Indonesian defence minister, Eddie Sudrajat, attacked Australia for granting bridging visas to 18 refugees. More than 1500 East Timorese currently in Australia are waiting the outcome of their refugee status which is being held in the balance as Howard tries to block their residency. They are being threatened with deportation to Portugal.

Australian foreign policy helps Australian businesses

Australian's foreign policy has made it possible for companies like BHP to express interest in buying into Krakatau steel, or for Berlei to transfer its plant from Lithgow to Jakarta, all the while sacking Australian workers. Australian activists should target such companies by asking them, at the very least, to pay their Indonesian workers the higher minimum wage demanded by the independent labour organisations, and if they don't, to run campaigns against them.

Australia currently has an aid program to Indonesia which provides A$90 million in aid annually, with little accountability. On June 3, the Australian government unveiled plans for a big increase in a "human rights" aid package to Indonesia. This package which will provide an extra A$2 million from AusAid is the largest single program offered to any country in Australia's aid program. This so-called "human rights" package involves the comprehensive education and training for government, military and police officials.

Much of Australian aid is being directed to the development of eastern Indonesia, with little consideration of how appropriate this development will be for local people, how it will impact on their cultures and environments. Nor does the Australian government show much concern about how the levels of corruption in Indonesia which allow the Suharto and Habibie families and their business cronies to commandeer new projects and allow them to circumvent what planning controls that exist.

End Australian military ties with Indonesia

Indonesians will never enjoy fundamental human rights and political freedoms while the military dominates their political life. Fundamental reform must strike at the heart of its power. Such things as ABRI's 75 appointed seats in parliament giving it a say in government, its high status in cabinet, its suffocating territorial surveillance along with the ability to arrest and intimidate with impunity must be abolished. Nor will the economy ever recover from its present disaster without such reform. Pro- democracy activists especially the People's Democratic Party call for the abolition of the dual function of the military, the law which allows ABRI to operate with impunity. Australia's military ties with Indonesia reflect its active policy of supporting and propping up dictatorships. This continues today. With the instalment of Habibie as the president, Howard immediately announced he would recognise the "new" government and pledged continuing support.

Both Liberal and Labor governments have consistently supported Indonesia's expansionist policy. With the payoff in lucrative contracts in the exploitation of oil, minerals and resources from East Timor, West Papua and Aceh, the Australian government has been happy to train and provide military aid for the exploitation and military occupation of these three countries. Australia has been aiding and abetting the Indonesia government, while being aware of the human rights abuses carried out by the Indonesian military.

Tony Burke is an ANU researcher and Canberra ASIET member